Injunctive relief in the Employment Relations Authority and Employment Court by Cornegé, Phillip.
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This paper examines the jurisdiction of both the Employment Relations Authority 
and Employment Court to grant Mareva injunctions and Anton Piller orders. The 
author argues that no sections in the Employment Relations Act 2000 empower 
either body to grant these orders. The author further examines the possible 
remedies defendants may seek 1f these orders have been granted ultra vires. 
Finally, the author argues that rh e Employment Relations Aurhority ( although 110 1 
the Employment Courr) should nor be given this power. 
I INTRODUCTION 
On May 7 2001, the Employment Relations Authority ("the Authority") 
granted its first Anton Piller order.' On June 19 2002, the Authority granted its first 
Mareva injunction .2 The employment Court has granted both types of order since 
1996.3 
Whether the Authority has jurisdiction to grant such orders is as debateable as 
the claimed basis of such jurisdiction is varied. Similarly, the jurisdictional basi s of 
the Employment Court's authority is also doubtful. 
This paper will first, briefl y outline the nature of these orders and secondl y, 
the basis upon which they have traditionall y been granted, both in the United 
Kingdom and New Zealand. Thirdly, this paper will argue that the Employment 
Relations Act 2000 ("ERA") empowers neither the Authority nor the Employment 
Court to make such orders. Presuming that neither body has the requisite jurisdiction, 
this paper wi II then assess the possible avenues of redress . 
Finally, this paper will argue that the Authority should not have such a power, 
iJTespective of whether it has jurisdiction. Although this paper will not address the 
issue in detail, the author expresses a preference for the power being extended to the 
Employment Court. 
1 A B Lui v Bro1vn (7 March 200 I Employment Relati ons Aut hority AA41/0 I, Mr A Dumbleton 
(member)). 
2 Wilson & H on an Ltd 1• A (19 June 2002 Emp loyment Relations Authorit y A uck land AA 187/02; 
AEASS0/02). 
3 McNaug/11 I' Predicr ( NZ) Ltd 11996] 2 ER Z 546. 
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II MAREVA INJUNCTIONS AND ANTON PILLER ORDERS 
Both the Mareva injunction and Anton Piller order are quia timet interlocutory 
orders of the court. 4 The former is prohibitory, made in personam, but operating in 
rem., without creating rights in rem. 5 The latter is mandatory and granted in 
personam.6 Both may be granted ex parte, without notice to the defendant or potential 
defendant, at any time during an action. The actions take their names from the first 
cases in which the English Court of Appeal considered and approved their granting. 7 
A Mareva injunctions 
The Mareva injunction temporarily freezes assets which may be required to 
satisfy a judgment in order to prevent their dissipation within, or removal from, the 
jurisdiction of the court. It gives the plaintiff no security, until judgment, over the 
frozen property.8 As the learned authors of Mareva Injunctions: Law and Practice 
note: 9 
[t]he purpose of a Mareva injunction is not to provide the applicant with any form of 
pre-trial attachment, but simp ly to prevent the injustice of a person removing or 
di ss ipating hi s [or her] assets so as to cheat the applicant of the fruits of his [or herJ 
c laim . 
4 Richard N. Ough The Mareva Injuncti on and Anton Piller Order: Practice and Precedents 
(Butterworths, London, 1987), para 1.0. 
5 Geraldine Andrews and Steven Gee Marei ,a lnj1111crions: LalV and Pracrice (Longman. London. 
1987), 5; see also Z Lrd \' A-Zand AA-LL J 1982] QB 558, 573, Lord Denning MR. 
6 Alrerrexr Inc v Advanced Dara Co111111unicarions Lrd [1985J l All ER 395; see also icola Burdon (ed) 
McCechan on Procedure (loose leaf. Brookers. Wellington) para HR33 l . l 7 (last updated September 
2003). 
7 Mareva Compania Naviera SA v lnremarional Bulk Carriers SA [1975] 2 Lloyd's Rep 509 (CA); in 
England, such orders are now ca lled freezing orders: see Andrew Beck Principles of Civil Procedure ('.2 
ed, Brookers, Wellington. 200 I ), para 9.6.1; Anton Piller KC, , Manufacruring Processes Lrd [ 1976] 
Ch 55 (CA) 
8 Mareva Co111pania Na, ,iera SA, above. /-/1111, 1· BP Explorario11 Co (Libya) Lrd [ 1980] I NZLR 104 
(SC). 
9 Geraldine Andrews and Steven Gee Marew1 lnJ11n crwm: Law and Pracuce (Longman. London, 
1987), 5; see also PCW ( Undenvriring Agencies) ,, Dixon [ 1983 J '.2 Lloyd's Rep 197. 
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Being equitable relief, the grant of the Anton Piller order and Mareva 
injunction , is discretionary .10 As Kerr LJ stated in Ninemia Corporation v Traw, 
GmbH, in reference to s 37(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 :11 
[t] he ultimate test for the exercise of the [Mareva] injunction is whether, in a ll the 
circumstances, the case is one in which it appears to the court "to be just and 
conve nient" to grant the injuncti on .. . Thus the cond uct of the plaintiffs may be 
matenal. and the nght of any third panie~ who may be affec ted by the grant of an 
injunction may often also ha ve to be borne in mind ... Further, it must always be 
remembered that if, or to the extent that, the grant of the Mareva injunction inflicts 
hardship on the defendants, their legitimate interests must prevail over those of the 
plaintiffs, who seek to o btain security for a claim which may appear to be well founded 
but which still remains to be established at the trial ... If (the plaintiffs] app ly for a 
Mareva injunct ion o n the ground that they have "a good arguable" case then the 
balance shou ld be weighed as we have indicated above. 
An applicant must show a good arguable case that she will succeed at trial, 
and that refusal of an injunction would involve a real risk that an eventual judgment 
or arbitral award could remain unsatisfied. 12 Further, the Court must consider the 
possible effect of the order on third parties, and thus draft it as clearly as possible.13 
The justification for granting Mareva relief is, in the words of Lord Denning, 
"the need to prevent a defendant snapping his [or her] fingers 14 at a judgment with 
financial impunity, simply because she has ainnged her affairs so as to leave no 
worthwhile assets within the reach of the plaintiff judgment creditor. 15 
B Anton Piller orders 
The Anton Piller order is a form of discovery, which has been likened to a 
civil search waffant. 16 This order entitles the plaintiff, or intended plaintiff, to search 
'
0 Richard N. Ough The Mareva /11jun c1io11 and All/on Piller Order: Practice and Precedenis 
(B utterworths, London, 1987), para 5.2.1. 
11 Ni11e111w Corporcuion 1· Trcn •e C111bH I 1983J I WLR 1-112 (CA). 1426. 
12 Ni11e1111a Corpora/ion 1• Trcn,e CmbH. above. 
13 Z Lid 1· A-Zand AA-LL [ I 982J QB 558 (CA). 
14 Penw11ina 11978 J I QB 66-1. 661. 
15 Mark S.W. Hoyle The Mareva lnJ1uzc1io11 and Re/wed Orders (2 ed. Lloyds, London, l 989), 11. 
16 Richard N. Ough The Mareva !11junc1ion and A111011 Piller Order: Practice and Precedenls 
(Butterworths, London, 1987), para I. l . 
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for ar1icles which are the subject of litigation and evidential material which may be 
relevant to proceedings. Once found, the plaintiff is then entitled to inspect the items 
in question, and remove them to the safe keeping of her solicitor or the court, to 
prevent it being removed, destroyed or concealed by the defendant. 17 However, Anton 
Piller orders are distinct from search waITants in that that they cannot be used to 
obtain evidence upon which to base a later claim. 18 
Although the statutory authority for granting an Anton Piller order is identica l 
to that of the Mareva injunction , given the draconian nature of Anton Piller orders the 
applicant must meet a stricter threshold. 19 In addition to the 'ultimate test ' of whether 
in all the circumstances the case appears to the Court to be one to be one where it 
would be "just and convenient" to grant the injunction ,20 the plaintiff must satisfy 
three essential pre-conditions set down by Ormrod LJ in the Anton Piller case: 21 
[f]irst, there must be an extremely strong prima facie case. Secondly, the damage to the 
plaintiff, potential or actual, must be very serious for the applicant. Thirdly, there must 
be clear evidence that the defendants have in their possession incriminating documents 
or things, and that there is a real possibility that they may destroy such material before 
any application inter partes can be made. 
In practice, Ormrod LJ's three conditions have not always been construed 
strictly, although the courts have tended to engage in periodic 'crackdowns' .22 
C Mareva injunctions and Anton Piller orders in New Zealand 
Both the Mareva injunction 23 and Anton Piller order 24 are established as part 
of New Zealand Law. 
17 Anton Piller; ex parte Island Records Ltd [ 1978) Ch 122 at 145 - there are certain 
guidelines/requirements/safeguards - e.g. full and frank disclosure, a cross- undertaking in damages and 
an undertaking to issue a writ (usually forthwith) if necessary: see Richard . Ough The Mareva 
Injunction and Anton Piller Order: Practice and Precedents (B utterworths , London, 1987), para 1.5. In 
the case of Mareva injunctions, such undertakings include safeguards to protect the interests of third 
parties: ee Babanaft International Co SA v Bassarne [ 1990) Ch 13. 
18 Hytrac Conveyors Ltd v Conveyors International Lid [ 1983] FSR 63 (CA). 
19 Yousif vSala111a [1980] I WLR 1540, 1544. 
20 See Part II A Mareva Injunctions. 
21 Anton Piller KC v Manujc,.cturing Processes Lui [ 19761 Ch 55 (CA). 62. 
22 See for example Columbia Picture lndustrieJ In c 1· Robinson [ 1987 j I Ch 38; see also Richard N. 
Ough The Mare1•a lnjun c1ion and Anton Piller Order: Prnc11ce and Precedents (B utterworths. London. 
1987), para 5.9.2. 
III JURISDICTION TO GRANT MAREVA INJUNCTIONS AND ANTON PILLER 
ORDERS 
A Jurisdiction in the United Kingdom 
I Mareva injunctions 
In Mareva Compania Naviera SA v International Bulk Carriers SA,25 Lord 
Denning refened to s 45 of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925 
(UK), which preserves s 25(8) of the Judicature Act 1875 : 
[a] mandamus or an injunction may be granted or a rece iver appointed by an 
interlocutory order of the court in all cases in whi ch it sha ll appear to the court to be 
just or convenient. 
Lord Denning continued: 26 
[ij n Beddow ,, Beddow ( 1878) 9 Ch D 89 Sir George Jessel, the then M aster of the 
Rolls, gave a very wide interpretation of this sec tion. He sa id: " I have unlimited power 
to grant an injunction in any case where it wo uld be right or just to do so". There is 
only one qualification to be made. The Court will not grant an injunction to protect a 
person who has no lega l or equitable ri ght whatever. . . But, subject to that qualification, 
the statute gi ves a wide power to the Courts. 
Roskill and Ormrod LLJ concun-ed. 
The inherent authority of the Court, the basis fo r the grant of the Mare\a 
injunction in the UK,27 is reproduced in sec tion 37( l ) of the Supreme Court Act 198 1 
(UK), which provides: 
37. Powers of High Court with respect to injunction and receivers 
23 Hunr v BP Explorarion Co (Libya) Lrd [ 1980) l NZLR 104 (SC) . 
24 Busby v Thorn EM! Video Programmes Lrd [1984] l ZLR 461 (CA) . 
25 Mareva Compania Naviera SA v !11rematio11al Bulk Carriers SA [ 1975) 2 Lloyd 's Rep 509 (CA). 26 Mareva Compa11ia Naviera SA , above, 510. 
27 Richard N . Ough Th e Mareva !11)1111ction and Anron Piller Order: Practice and Precedents 
(Butterworrhs, L ondon, 1987), para 2.6. 
( l) The High Court may by order ( whether interlocutory or final) grant an 
injunction or appoint a receiver in all cases in which it appears to the court to 
be just and convenient to do so. 
2 Anton Piller orders 
9 
Order 29 rule 2 of the Rules of the Supreme Court (UK) empowered the High 
Court to authorise entry onto the property of a party, following an application inter 
partes, in order to inspect, detain or preserve property which is , or may be, the subject 
matter of the action. However, the Rules of the Supreme Court did not authorise the 
High Court to grant such an order upon ex parte application. 
Irrespective of this , Lord Denning MR granted an equitable order on the basis 
of Order 29 rule 2, and "the inherent jurisdiction of the court". 28 This came to be 
known as the Anton Piller order. The ability to grant Anton Piller orders is therefore 
founded on the cou11's inherent jurisdiction to prevent a defendant frustrating 
judgment, in this case by destroying or disposing of either the evidence or the subject 
f h d. 79 matter o t e I spute. -
B The jurisdiction of the New Zealand High Court 
1 The Court's inherenl jurisdiction. 
The High Court is a court of record, 30 established for the "administration of 
justice throughout New Zealand"31 and it is clearly a supe1ior court. 32 As such, the 
High Court is not required to Act within the bounds of its constitutive statute. 33 
28 Anton Piller KC v Manufacruring Processes Lui [ 19761 Ch 55, 61. 
29 Mark S.W. Hoyle The Mareva !11j1111C1ion and Related Orders (2 ed. Lloyds. London. 1989). 11 7 
30 A court of record is one that can fine or imprison for con tempt: see Beck. above. para 2.2. 1; see also 
fa P Coldsbro11gh Murr & Cu Lid; Re Ma~mrh ( 1931 l 32 SR ( SW) :n8 rh,s pm"er ,~ nm l1m11ed tu 
superior courts: see Distnct Courts Act 19..+7 s 112. 
31 Judicature Act 1908, s 3. 
32 This is implicit is the definition of an inferi or court ins 2 of the Judicature Act: a court whose 
jurisdiction is inferior to the High Court: see Andrew Beck Principles of Civil Procedure (2 ed, 
Brookers, Wellington 2001), para 2.2.l. 
33 Inferior courts are required to act within the bounds of their consti tuti ve statutes: R ,. Chancellor of Sr 
Ed11111nsbury (1948] l KB 195 ,206; Ca::.ley v Lord Cooke ofThomdon [1999] 2 NZLR 668 (CA); A-C 
v Reid [2000] 2 NZLR 377 (HC). 
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Unless expressly abrogated by statute or common law rules , the High Court has 
unlimited jurisdiction.34 
The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court empowers it to summarily deal 
with matters that arise before it to ensure "the machinery of justice is able to tum 
smoothly". 35 It is possessed by superior cow1s of record and exists only as part if the 
court's general jurisdiction. 
Inherent ju1isdiction refers to the court 's power to make orders ancillary to the 
exercise of jurisdiction in the primary sense. 36 The High Court has an ability to 
exercise its inherent jurisdiction in circumstances which cannot be sufficiently dealt 
with using statuto1ily confened powers or the rules of the Court. In such cases, the 
Court will invoke the inherent jurisdiction to fu11her the administration of justice.37 
Section 16 of the Judicature Act 1908 affirms the inherent jurisdiction 
possessed by the High Court. 38 Section 16 provides: 
[t]he court shall continue to have all the jurisdiction which it had on the co ming into 
operati on of thi s Act and all jurisdiction which may be necessary to administer the Jaws 
of New Zealand. 
There are two distinct aspects to the court 's jurisdiction as provided for in s 16 
"the continuation of its historical jurisdiction and a statutory affirmation of the 
court's inherent jurisdiction". 39 The inherent jurisdiction is "sourced in the very nature 
34 Andrew Beck Principles of Civil Procedure (2 ed, Brookers , Wellington 2001 ), para 2.2.l. 
35 Nicola Burdon (ed) McCechan 0 11 Procedure ( looseleaf, Brookers, Wellington) para J 16.05 ( last 
updated September 2003) . 
36 Taylor 1• A-C [ J 975J 2 NZLR 675,682 (CA) 
37 The Court of Appeal has noted that it is both unnecessary and un wise to attempt to defi ne the scope 
of the Court 's inherent jurisdiction: see R v Make and La wrence [ 1996) l NZLR 263 (CA). This paper 
will therefore not seek to define the inherent j urisdiction. 
38 Section 16 does not, however , bestow the inherent jurisdiction, and simpl y recogni ses the existence 
of powers ori ginating elsewhere. See Nicola Burdon (ed) McCechan 011 Procedure ( loo~eleaf, 
Brookers, Wellington) para J 16.07 ( last updated September 2003). 
39 Andrew Beck Prin ciples of Civil Procedure (2 ed, Brookers, Wellington, 2001), para 2.2. l ; see also 
Quality Pi::.::.as Lrd v Canterb111y Hotel Employees Industrial Union [ 1983) ZLR 6 12 (CA), 6 15; 
Ca::.ley v Lord Cooke of Th omdon J 1999] 2 NZLR 668 (CA), 674. 
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of the Cou11 as a Court of law" .'w Sir Jack Jacob has described the court's inherent 
jurisdiction as follows: 41 
[t]he essential character of a superior Court of law necessaril y in vo lves that it should 
be in vested with a power to maintain its authority and to prevent its process being 
obstructed and abused. Such a power is intrinsic in a superior Court ... The juridical 
basis of thi s jurisdicti on is therefore the authority of the judi ciary to uphold , to protect 
and to fulfil the judicial function of administering justice according to law in a regular, 
orderl y and effective manner. 
In Hunt v BP Exploration Co (Libya) Ltd,42 the Supreme Court decided that it 
had the jurisdiction to grant a Mareva injunction. Barker J stated that he did not accept 
the view that this deci sion intruded into an area reserved for legislation . The Coun·s 
inherent jurisdiction was the basis upon which Barker J concluded he had jurisdiction 
to grant Mareva injunctions ... 3 
The power of the Court to grant a Mareva injunctions is now confirmed by r 
236B HCR, which gives express jurisdiction to grant orders over assets held in Nev\ 
Zealand. However, orders made under the inherent jurisdiction are still required to 
freeze assets held outside New Zealand. 44 The Dist1ict Court can grant Mareva 
injunctions, however, it may do so only in respect of property situated in New 
Zealand. 45 
The jurisdiction of the High Court to grant Anton Piller orders was recogni sed 
by the Court of Appeal in Busby v Thom EM/ Video Programmes Lt~6 on the basis 
of the High Court's inherent jurisdiction. The High Court subsequently recei ved 
legislative acknowledgement of thi s power..;7 
40 Nico la Burdon (ed) McCechan on Procedure (looseleaf, Brookers, Wellington) para J 16.07 ( la!, t 
updated September 2003). The High Court cannot, however. act contrary to any statutory prov1s1on : see 
Taylor 1•A-C [1975] 2 NZLR 675 (CA) . 
.ii Sir Jack Jacob ·'The Inherent Jurisdi ct ion of the Court'" ( 1970) CLP 23, 27. 
42 Hunt v BP Explo ration Co (Libya) Ltd I 19801 I NZLR 104 (HC). 
43 Hunt v BP Exploration Co ( Libya) Ltd, above. 
44 Fitzherbert v Faisandier (1995) 8 PRNZ 592. 
45 District Courts Act 1947, s 42(2). 
46 Busby 1• Thom EM! Video Progra111111es Ltd [ 1984] I NZLR 461 (CA). 
47 Judicature Act 1908, s 261(4); District Courts Act 1947, s 42(3). 
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IV DOES THE AUTHORITY HA VE JURISDICTION? 
The starting point of thi s analysis must be that the Authority is purely a 
creature of statute .48 Unlike the High Court, the Authority is not a court of inherent 
jurisdiction, and unlike the Employment Court,49 it is not a court of record. As such, 
the Authority must act within the bounds of its constitutive statute, in thi s case, the 
ERA. 50 
Determinations of the authority have pointed to various sections in the ERA as 
providing jurisdiction to grant such orders. The validity of each of these claims is 
assessed below. The somewhat varied basis upon which the Authority believes 
jurisdiction is founded demonstrates the strained nature of its analysis. 51 
A Duty to consider mediation 
As the Learned Authors of Brookers Employment Law note , "at first glance it 
might be thought that the prospect of the Authority or [Employment] Court maki ng an 
Anton Piller order [or Mareva injunction] does not sit easily with the duty to consider 
mediation under ss 159 and 188".52 However, subs (2)(b)(iii) of each of the 'e 
provisions allows the Authority and Employment Court to avoid mediation if it would 
"undermine the urgent or interim nature of the proceedings". Given that , in any 
situation where a Mareva injuncti on or Anton Piller order is necessary, the applicant 
48 Employment Relations Act 2000, s 156. 
49 Employment Relations Act 2000, s 186( l ) . 
50 R v Chancellor of Sr Ed111unsbury [1948] l KB 195,206; Cazley v Lord Cooke of Thomdon [ 1999] 2 
NZLR 668 (CA); A-C v Reid [2000] 2 ZLR 377 (HC). 
51 The Authority has granted Mareva injunctions in the fo llowing cases: Wilson & Honan Ltd,, A ( 19 
June 2002 Employment Relations Authority Auck land AAl87/02; AEA550/02); Bell v Delta 
Construction and Develop111 e11t Ltd ( 16 August 2002 Employment Relations A uthority Auckland 
AA239/02; AEA 765/02. Mr A Dumbleton (member)); Dobby v NZ Media Croup Ltd (30 October 2002 
Employment Relations Authority Christchurch CA I 10/02; CEA393/02, Mr P Cheyne (member)) ; 
McA!ister & Anor v Cay111a11 Holdings Ltd (5 December 2002 Employment Relallons Authorit) 
Auckland AA 352/02; AEA 11 76/02. Mr A Dumbleton (member) ). The A uthority has granted nton 
Piller orders in the fo llowing cases: AB Ltd,, Bro1Vn (7 March 200 1 Employment Relallons Aut hority 
AA41/0 l , Mr A Dumbleton (member)); Strew Path Trust, , Broll ( 13 ovember 2001 Employment 
Relations Authority Auck land AA 185/0 I ; AEA847/0 I ); Pacific Pham,acewical, Ltd, . Kwnm;an (27 
Augu t 2002 Emp loyment Relations Aui hont) Auckland AA257/02; A620/0'.2): Kell, Semce, 
(New Zealand) Ltd v Kelllp (2 May 2003 Employment Relations Authority Chris tch urch CA-+4/03 ; 
CEAl33/03); Advanced Hair Studio Ltd, . Barry (5 June 2003 Emp loyment Relations A uthority 
Auckland AAl65/03; AEA379/03) 
52 Jason Bull (ed) Brookers E111ploy111ent un,· ( looseleaf, Brookers. Wellington, Employment Relallons 
Act 2000) para ER22 l.06 (last updated August 2003). 
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will have had to prove urgency, the duty of the Authority/Employment Court to 
consider mediation is not necessarily fatal to a finding that either body has the 
requisite jurisdiction . 
B Sections 157(3) and 160(1)([) of the ERA? 
In McAlister v Cayman Holdings Ltcl,53 the Authority held that it had 
jurisdiction to grant Mareva injunctions, and relied upon ss 157(3) and s 160(l)(f) of 
the Employment Relations Act 2000 as the source of thi s power. 
Section 157 of the ERA provides: 
157 Role of Authority 
( 1) The Authority is an in vesti gati ve body that has the role of reso lving 
employment relat ionship problems by establi shing the facts and making a 
determination according to the substantial merits of the case, without regard to 
technica lities. 
(2) The Authority must, in carrying out its ro le, -
(a) compl y with the principles of natural justice; and 
(b) ai m to promote good fai th behaviour; and 
(c) support successful employme nt relattonsh tps; and 
(d) genera ll y further the objeci of this Acl. 
[(2A) Subsection (2)(a) does not require the Authority to allow the cros~-
examination of a party or person, but the A uthority may, in its absolute 
discreti on, permit such cross-examination.] 
(3) The Authoriiy mus! ac i as it thinks fit in eq uity and good consc ience, but may 
not do anything that is inconsistent wi th thi s Act or with the relevant 
employment agreement. 
Section 160 of the ERA provides : 
53 McA !isrer & Anor v Cay11w11 Holdings Lrd (5 December 2002 Employmenl Relati ons A uthorn y 
Auckland AA 352/02; AEA 1176/02. Mr A Dumbleton (member)) . 
160 Powers of Autho.-ity 
( 1) The Authority may, in investigating any matter, -
(a) call for evidence and information from the parties or from any other person: 
(b) require the parties or any other per~on to attend an investigation meeting to 
give evidence: 
(c) interview any of the parties or any person at any time before an investigation 
meeting: 
(d) in the course of an investigation meeting, fully examine any witness: 
(e) decide that an investigation meeting should not be in public or should not be 
open to certain persons: 
(t) follow whatever procedure the Authority considers appropriate. 
(2) The Authority may take into account such evidence and information as 1n equity 
and good conscience it thinks fit, whether strictly legal evidence or not. 
(3) The Authority is not bound to treat a matter as being a matter of the type 
described by the parties, and may, in investigating the matter, concentrate on 
resolving the employment relationship problem, however described. 
In relation to s 157(3) and s 160(l)(f), the Authority stated that: 54 
[i]t seems implicit from these provisions that, like other courts, the Authority should 
not stand by when there is a likelihood that the object of its jurisdiction will be 
defeated if a party is able to out-manoeuvre another party who may become entitled to 
recover money or other remedies. by formal execution or enforcement if necessary. 
J.j 
Neither s 157, s 160, nor a combination of the two, provide the Authority with 
the requisite jurisdiction. Section 157 sets out the role of the Authority, in particular. 
its investigative role. Section 157(3) emphasises the ability of the authority to drive 
the case in a flexible way. Section 157(3) does not, however, concern the Authority's 
remedial jurisdiction. 
54 
McA/isier & Anor v Cay111an Holdings Lid (5 December 2002 Employment Relations Authority 
Auckland AA 352/02; AEA 1176/02, Mr A Dumbleton (member)). 
15 
Section 160(1) confers on the autho1ity several powers to enable it to carry out 
its investigatory role. Section 160(l)(f) provides the Authority with discretion as to 
the procedure it may follow. While evidence that could properly be the subject matter 
of an Anton Piller order may be relevant to the Authority's investigation, s 160 is 
procedural in nature , and does not confer on the Authority any power to grant 
injunctive relief. 
1 The Parliamentary debates 
Recourse to Hansard is not particularly helpful in determining the proper 
scope of ss 157 and 161 , particularly their scope, if any, in combination. Other 
than a comment by Owen Jennings55 to the effect that the government had not, 
as yet, provided a definition of "good faith" in clause 169 of the Bill ,56 Richard 
Worth57 did note that clauses 169, 172 and 173 ,58 when read together, might 
have potential legal implications. This statement does not , however, lend 
support to the Authority's contention that ss 157 and 161 , in combination, 
empower it to grant Mareva relief. 
C Section 162 of the ERA? 
In AB Ltd v Brown,59 the first case in which Anton Piller order was granted 
under the ERA, the Autho1ity held that it had jurisdiction on the basis of s 162 of the 
ERA. As s 162 also applies to the Employment Court, this part of the paper also 
concerns the scope of the Court's injunctive jurisdiction. 
Section 162 provides: 
162 Application of law relating to contracts 
55 0 Jennings (9 August 2000) 589 NZPD 4499. 
56 Clause 169 is the equivalent of s I 57 in the ERA. 
57 R Worth (9 August 2000) 589 NZPD 4488. 
58 Sections 157, 161 and 162 of the ERA. 
59 AB Ltd v Brown (7 March 2001 Employment Relations Authority AA41/0l, Mr A Dumbleton 
(member)). 
Subject to sections 163 and 164. the Authority may, in any matter related to an 
employment agreement, make any order that the High Court or a District Court may 
make under any enactment or rule of law relating to contracts, including-
(a) the Contracts (Privity) Act 1982: 
(b) the Contractual Mistakes Act 1977: 
(c) the Contractual Remedies Act 1979: 
(d) the Fair Trading Act 1986: 
(e) the Frustrated Contracts Act I 944: 
(f) the Minors' Contracts Act 1969. 
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In McAlister & Anor v Cayman Holdings Ltd,60 the Authority, in determining 
it had jurisdiction to grant Mareva injunctions , made reference to the Employment 
Court's decision in McNaughr v Predicr (NZ) Lrd,61 which concerned s 104(1 )(h) of 
the Employment Contracts Act 1991 ("ECA"). As the Authority stated: 
[u]nder [the Employment Contracts] Act it seems Mareva injunctions 
were granted by the Court on the basis that they were an order that the 
High Court could make under any enactment or rule or law relating to 
contracts. This was the jurisdiction of the Employment Court found 
under s 104(l)(h) of the 1991 Act. In this respect the wording of s 162 
of the Employment Relations Act 2000 is identical and has the effect of 
extending the jurisdiction of the Authority considerably. 
Similarly, in Advanced Hair Studio Ltd v Barry,62 the Authority referred to s 
104(l)(h) as providing the Employment Court jurisdiction to grant Anton Piller 
orders, and, by analogy to s 162, providing the Authority jurisdiction. The Authority 
stated: 63 
[ijn the contract law, particularly in relation to employment, Anton Piller orders were 
made by the Employment Court from time to time under the Employment Contracts 
Act 1991. The Court had jurisdicuon under s l 04( l )(h) in any proceedings founded on 
60 McA /is1er & Anor v Cay111a11 Holdings Lid (S December 2002 Employment Relations Authority 
Auckland AA 352/02; AEA 1176/02, Mr A Dumbleton (member)). 
61 McNauglt1 v Predic1 (NZ) Lid [ 1996] ~ ERNZ 5-t6. 
62 Advanced Hair Studio Ltd I ' Barry (S June 2003 Employment Relations Authority Auckland 
AA165/03 ; AEA379/03). 
63 Advanced Hair S1udio Lid, above, paras -9. 
or relating to an employment contract to make any order that the High Court could 
make under any enactment or rule of law relating to contract. This, presumably, was 
the particular jurisdiction relied on by the Court in NZ Food lndusmes Li1111red , 
Suckling unreported. 29 Augu!>t I 986, A 128/96, when granting an Anton Piller order in 
that case. 
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CuITently, s 162 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 confers similar 
jurisdiction on the Authority to that given by the 1991 Act to the Court under s 
104(l)(h). 
1 Section 104( 1 )( h) of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 
Section 104(l)(h) of the ECA provides: 
104 Jurisdiction 
(h) Subject to subsection (2) of thi s section, to make in any proceedings founded 
on or relating to an employment contract any order that the High Court or a 
District Court may make under any enactment or rule of lav. relating to 
contracts: 
Although s 104(l)(h) is substantially similar to s 162, s 162 does not provide 
either the Authority or the Employment Court the power to grant Mareva injunctions 
or Anton Pi Iler orders. First, decisions by the Employment Court under the ECA 
relying on s 104(l)(h) as a basis for granting Mareva injunctions or Anton Piller 
orders were wrongly decided. Secondly, there are relevant difference between s 
104(l)(h) and s 162 which make the arguments re lating to the ECA less relevant. 
2 Pre-ERA Jurisprudence 
In McNaught v Predict (NZ) Ltd,64 the Employment Court granted its first 
Mareva injunction . In thi s case, the plaintiffs c laimed aITears of wages and ho liday 
pay. As the plaintiffs were concerned that the money in the defendant's bank account 
would be dispersed to pay un sec ured debts of the company, the y sought to obtain a 
64 McNa11ght v Predict (NZ) Lrd (1996] 2 ERNZ 546 (EC). 
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Mareva injunction from the Employment Court preventing the defendant from doing 
so. 
Having noted s 104(l)(h), Judge Travis then made reference tor 236(b) HCR 
(the statutory equivalent of the Mareva injunction), holding that Mareva injunctions 
are orders the High Court can make, and, in this case, the plaintiff's claims were 
based on employment contracts. Section 104(1 )(h) was therefore satisfied, and the 
Employment Court was empowered to grant a Mareva injunction. 
In coming to this conclusion, Judge Travis made reference to the decision of 
the Court of Appeal in Hobday v Timaru Girls ' High School Board of Trustees,65 
affirming the decision of the Employment Court in X v Y Ltd and NZ Stock 
Exchange. 66 His honour does not, however, analyse the applicability of those 
decisions in the case of Mareva injunctions, simply stating that the "same line of 
reasoning would apply to injunctions to preserve assets". 67 It is important to re-
examine the validity of McNaught v Predict (NZ) Ltd, as almost all decisions of both 
the Auth01ity and Employment Court granting Mareva injunctions or Anton Piller 
orders rely upon the decision as authority. 68 
In Xv Y Ltd and NZ Srock Exchange, the full Court of the Employment Court 
held, on the basis of s 104(l)(h) ECA, that it was able to grant interim reinstatement. 
In this case, the Court had to consider whether s 104(l)(h) allowed the Employment 
Court to grant injunctive relief or. as counsel for the defendant submitted, whether 
"the phrase 'rule of law ' means a substantive rule of common law such as may be 
65 Hobday v Ti111aru Girls ' High School Board of Trustees (1993) 2 ER Z 146 (CA). 
66 X v Y Lr.d a11d NZ Stock Exchange I 1992) l ERNZ 863 (EC). 
67 McNaught v Predict ( NZ) Ltd, above, 548. 
68 Employment Court: Attorney-General 011 Behalf of The Department of Labour v Sivoravong ( 11 
November 1999 Employment Court Auckland AC89/99; AEC162/99, Judge Colgan); Emerson v 
Woodward (17 March 1999 Employment Court Auckland AC18/99; AEC29/99, Judge Colgan); 
Kerrigan v Fun Station Kinderga rte11 Ltd (5 March 1999 Employment Court Auckland AC 14/99; 
AEC22/9, Judge Colgan); Neilson v Bestline Industries Ltd ( 5 February 1998 Employment Court 
Auckland AEC6/98; Al 3/98, Judge Colgan); Westley v Tnangle Cables (NZ) Ltd ( 13 November 1997 
Employment Court Auckland AEC133/97; Al6-i/97, Judge Travis). Authority: Wilson & Horton Ltd, . 
A ( 19 June 2002 Employment Relations Authority Auckland AA 187/02; AEA550/0'.2); Bell,, Delta 
Constrnction and De, ,elop111 e111 Ltd ( 16 August 2002 Emp loyment Relations Authority uck land 
AA239/02; AEA765/02, Mr A Dumbleton (member)); Dobby ,. NZ Media Croup Ltd (30 October 2002 
Employment Relations Authority Christchurch CA l 10/02; CEA393/02, Mr P Cheyne (member)); 
McAlister & Anor v Cay111a11 Holdings Ltd (5 December 2002 Employment Relati ons Authority 
Auckland AA 352/02; AEA 1176/02, Mr A Dumbleton (member)). 
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applied to the merits of an application for injunction but only once the Court has 
jurisdiction to entertain that". 69 The Court rejected this decision , and held that the 
plain words of the section could not be said to limit the Cou11 ' s jurisdiction in thi s 
way. As Judge Colgan stated: 70 
l w]e agree that s I 04( I )(h) cannot be read in isolation nor can certain words in thi s 
subsection be minutely and technicall y examined when consideration is given to such a 
fundamental issue as jurisdiction. It was the plain intention of Parliament by enacting 
ss 3 and 4 of the Act as we ll as · I 04( I )(g) and (h) to transfer the whole of the 
juri sdi ction o f the ordinary Courts in relation to contracts of emp loyme nt to the 
Employment Court. . We agree that the words of s 104(l)( h) give effect in plain 
language to that legislat i ve intention and we do not accept Mr Gray's argument that 
mention of injunctions in some parts o f the Act should be taken to exc lude that remed y 
from other parts. Such an argument fails to address the purposes of the Act, including 
the promotion of an effective labour market and the vesting of all powers in one set of 
speciali st institutions. 
In Hobday v Tim.aru Girls' High School Board of Trustees, the Court of 
Appeal approved of the reasoning of the Employment Cou11 in Xv Y Ltd. The Court 
cited with approval the above passage, and further noted: 71 
[w]e entirely agree with the reasoning and concl usion reached there by the Court, 
which were relied on by Judge Palmer in the present case; and we are not persuaded 
otherwise by Mr Couch's painstaking analysis of the Act, includ1ng the adoption of 
arguments whi ch were so effectively re1ected Ill X v Y Indeed. it wou ld be an 
ex traordinary situati on if something so fundamental as the preservat ion of the pos iti on 
of an employee co mplaining of unjustifi ed dismissal could not be pre~erved pending 
resolution of hi s or her personal gri evance. when the Act provides for reinstatement as 
a remedy. Because it is virtuall y impossible to have immediate adj udica tion by Courts 
or tribunal s, protection of the status quo is genera ll y ava ilab le 111 other areas of 
liugation or dispute reso lution. It ca nnot ha ve been the intention of the Legislature to 
deny thi s remedy to employees 1nvolved with the new procedures under the 
Employment Contracts Act; to do so would be quite inconsis tent with its emphasis on 
mediation and settlement. 
69 Xv Y Ltd and NZ Stock Exchange [ 1992] I ERNZ 863 (EC), 870. 
70 X v Y Ltd and NZ Stock Exchange, above, 87 1. 
71 Hobday v Ti111aru Girls ' High School Board of Trustees [ 1993] 2 ERNZ 146 (CA), 162-163. 
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Importantly, the Court held that the wording of s 104(l)(h) is wide enough to 
"encompass the High Court's powers to make interim injunctions relating to 
contracts ... ". 72 
3 Was McNaught correctly decided ? 
The author contends that s the wording of s 104(l)(h) and s 162 does not 
permit the Authority or Employment Court to grant any order it wishes, as long as the 
order is related to a contract. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a dispute coming before 
either tribunal that would not concern a contract of employment. The interpretation 
presently favoured by both the Authority and Employment Court is so expansive that 
there appears to be very little limit on what remedies the bodies can provide. This can 
not have been the intention of Parliament. A better interpretation is that the 
Authority/Employment Court are authorised to make orders of a contractual nature 
only, for example, va1iation or cancellation . 
Judge Travis ' reliance on Hobday and Xv Y Ltd in concluding that the Court 
did have the requisite jurisdiction is , with respect, fundamentally flawed. Both Court 
were simply considering whether the words "any enactment or rule of Jaw relating to 
contract" permitted the Employment Court to grant interim injunctions . The 
conclusion reached in these cases is hardly controversial. Indeed, Judge Colgan put it 
well in Jerram v Franklin Veterinary Services ( 1977) Ltd, where he said: 73 
I found the following argument put forward by Mr Grace to be more persuasive. He 
said that because each of the seven li sted statutes in s 162 permits the Authority, in a 
substantive matter before it, to grant relief in various ways including by injunction, it 
must follow by necessary implication that the Authority also possesses the power to 
preserve or alter the rights and ob li gations of the parties pending its determination of a 
claim to substantive relief under these statutes. In the case of the Ill egal Contracts Act 
1970, for example. s 7 empowers the Au thont1 to grant relief by wa1 of rest1tullon. 
compensa tion. variation of the con tract, validation of the contract in whole or 111 part. 
and this may be done by application seeking either a declarat1on or 1nJunct1on. Similar 
powers are contained in, fo r example, s 7(3) Contractual Mistakes Act 1977. ss 9(2) 
n Hobday, above, 163. 
73 Jerra111 v Franklin Ve1er111a1 y Sen,ices ( 1977) Ltd [200 I] I ERNZ 157 (EC), 165-166. This was the 
first case to challenge the power of the A uthority to exercise powers not express ly provided for 111 the 
ERA. 
and (3) and 15 Contractual Remedies Act 1979, s 7 Contracts (Privity) Act 1982, ss 
27and 41 Fair Trading Act 1986, and so on. It was said that what the Authority may do 
substantively, it must also necessaril y be able to do on an interim basis . That was the 
reasoning applied by the Co urt o f Appeal in the Timaru Girl s High School case leading 
to its conclusion that the Emplo yment Co urt did have the po wer to order interim 
reinstatement in employment by injunctio n. 
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Neither the Court of Appeal nor the Employment Court heard argument on 
whether s 104(l)(h) allows the Employment Court to grant interim injunctions which 
are not of a contractual nature, but simply relate to an employment contract. Indeed, 
there is a suggestion in X v Y Ltd, cited by the Court of Appeal in Hobday , that the 
order, interim or otherwise, must still be a contractual remedy. The Employment 
Com1 noted the decision of the Court of Appeal in NZ Banking Trades IUOW v 
General Foods Corporation (NZ) (1985] 2 NZLR 110,74 where Cooke P held that 
"[i]njunctions - interim or final - are a standard remedy for actionable interference 
with contractual rights". 75 
Interim reinstatement is an order of a contractual nature. The purpose of an 
order for interim reinstatement is to ·'preserve the position of an employee 
complaining of unjustified dismissal ".76 In this respect, interim reinstatement simply 
gives effect to an employee's contractual rights. Given this, the Court in both X v Y 
and Hobday were acting within the clear words of s 104(l)(h).77 
4 The purpose of section J 62 
Under the ECA, concern was occasionally expressed that the Employment 
Tribunal's ("the Tribunal") ability to adequately resolve employment disputes was 
limited by its inability to grant remedies under any of the p1imary contractual statutes . 
As Judge Colgan noted: 78 
74 NZ Banki11g Trades !V OW v General Foods Co,pormion (NZ) [ 1985] 2 ZLR 110 (CA ). 75 NZ Banking Trades !VOW, above. 11 8. 
76 Hobday v Timaru Girls' High School Board ofTrus1 ees 11993] 2 ERNZ 146 (CA). 163. 77 See generally Peter Agnew (ed) Ma ::.engarb 's E111ploy111en1 La11 · (looseleaf. Butterwo rth s. 
Wellington) para ER 127 .3 ( last updated September 2003) . 
78 Bongard v Universal Business Direc1ories Lid [ 19951 I ERNZ 393 (E ). 404-405 . See al so A 
Dumbleton "The Employme nt Tribunal: fo ur years o n" (1996) 21 ZJIR 2 1. 32-33; Jason Bull (ed ) 
Brookers E111ploy111 en1 Lall' ( looseleaf. Brooker ·, Wellingto n. Employ ment Re lauo ns Act 2000 ) para 
ER162 .04 (last updated Aug ust 2003). 
!tJhe next matter upon which l propose to comment briefly is the difficulty that the 
Tribunal, the Court and parties may ha ve in cases such as thi s as a result of the 
restricti ons upon the ability of the Employment Tribunal to apply important contractual 
statutory provisions to its consideration of cases and for the Court to do so on appeals. l 
understand that Tribunal members see themselves without jurisdiction to apply the 
provisions of the Contractual Remedies Act, the Contractual Mistakes Act and the 
Contracts (Privity) Act as the result of the absence in the Tribunal's jurisdiction section 
(s 79) of an equivalent to s l 04( l )( h). If that is so, and there is apparently as yet no 
authoritative ruling on the question, then it may be that parties to proceedings in the 
Employment Tribunal are. prec luded from ha vi ng access to the range of remedial 
statutes which Parliament has determined should modify the common law of con tract 
in appropriate cases and which is open to liti gants in the non-specialist Courts and ,n 
this Court. 
Although the Tribunal could make orders under the contractual enactments , it 
was permitted to do so "only if satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that such an order 
should be made and that any other remedy would be inappropriate or inadequate". 79 
The Court often criticised this provision. 80 
By not replicating s 104(2),81 "Parliament has gone some distance towards 
acknowledging the force of each of the pending concems". 82 
5 The scope ofsecrion 162 
The focus of s 162 is on contractual remedies only. As the learned authors of 
Brookers Employment Law note , "when dealing with employment agreements, the 
Authority may make any order that the High Court or Dist1ict Courts may make under 
any statutes relating to contracts". 83 Although this description may be somewhat 
limited, in that the power of the Authority/Employment Court under s 162 extends to 
the rules of law as well as enactments and, therefore, presumably the common law, 
79 Employment Contracts Act 1991 , s 104(2). 
80 See for example Radio Horowhen ua Lid v Bradley [1993] 2 ERNZ 1085 (EC), 1097. 
81 Although note that the power of the Authority to cancel or vary an employment agreement is 
similarl y limited: Employment Relations Act 2000, s 164(d). 
82 Jason Bull (ed) Brookers Employment Lcrn· (looseleaf, Brookers, Wellington, Employment Relations 
Act 2000) para ER162.04 (last updated August 2003). 
83 Jason Bull (ed) Brookers E111ploy111en1 Law, above, para ERl62.02. 
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the tenor of this statement is coITect. Section 162 is concerned with orders of a 
contractual nature , such as variation, suspension or cancellation of an employment 
agreement. Simply put, the order must relate to contract law , rather than the case in 
question being about a contract. 
This interpretation is supported by the inclusion of the primary contractual 
statutes in New Zealand, which were not explicitly referred to in s 104(l)(h). Indeed, 
Parliament rejected an amendment , proposed by Ge1Ty Brownlee, that the statutory 
references in subclause (l)(b)-(g) be removed. 84 In light of the express inclusion of 
these provisions, albeit not exclusive, Parliament cannot have intended that s 162 
empower the Authority/Employment Cou11 to grant orders that were not of a 
contractual nature. 
This analysis is further supported by reference to ss 162 and 163 of the ERA. 
which limit the Authority 's power to vary or cancel both collective and individual 
employment agreements. Further, it should be noted that, in s 127,85 Parliament has 
specifically provided the Authority the power to grant interim reinstatement, the 
power in question in both X v Y and Hobday. 86 If, as the Authority claimed in 
McAlister & Anor v Cayman Holdings Ltd,87 Parliament must have been aware of the 
way in which the Employment Court used s 104(l )(h) when enacting s 162. then 
Parliament's intention was clearly to alter that scope - iITespective of whether the pre-
ERA position is conceptually defensible . 
Against this backdrop, Parliament clearly envisioned that s 162 would 
authorise the order of contractual remedies , whether interim or otherwise. However, it 
cannot be said that s 162 extends an y further than thi s - such an interpretation is 
manifestly at odds with both the clear words of Parliament and the su1Toundin g 
statutory scheme. Further, the os tensibl y supporting case law , namely McNaughr . ,s 
based upon a flawed reading of previous authority and should not be considered good 
law. 
84 Hon G Braybrooke (9 August 2000) 589 NZPD 4523 . Note, however, that the all amendments 
r _roposed by the oppos ition were rejec ted. and too much cannot. therefore. be read into thi s. 
) Employment Rela11 on~ Act '.WOO.~ 127. 
80 Sec tion 127(7) affirms the Empl oyment Court \ ability to grant interim reinstatement. 
87 M cALisrer & Anor v Cayman HoldingJ Lrd (5 December 2002 Employment Relations A uthorit y 
Auckland AA 352/02; AEA 11 76/02. Mr A Dumbleton (member)). 
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6 Parliament's intent ? 
Reference to Hansard is , unfortunately, not overly elucidating. Only two, 
opposition, members made any reference of substance to s 162, and their comments 
do little other than reflect the underlying debate . The Honourable Bill English noted 
that cl 173 of the Bill empowered Authority members to make orders the High Court 
may make under contractual statutes. 88 Simon Power, however, claimed that cl 173 
would authorise members to make "any order that a High Court or Di strict Court 
could make". 89 Although, as observed earlier, Bill s English's comments may be 
somewhat naITow , they are generally reflective of the scope of the clause. The reader 
should not place too much weight upon the comments of Simon Power, which were 
made to try to discredit a Government Bill , and are exaggerated. 
Further, the Explanatory ate to the Employment Relations Bill 2000 is of 
limited assistance, as it simply repeats the content of s 162 without explanation.90 
7 Are Mareva injunctions and Anton Piller orders "related to 
contract"? 
If, however, s 162 is not limited to orders of a contractual nature, and simpl y 
requires the order to rel ate to an employment agreement , Mareva relief and Anton 
Piller orders will not fall within thi s definition. In Mercedes-Ben-::. v Leiduck, 91 the 
House of Lords discussed, at length , the nature of the Mareva injunction . As Lord 
Musti 11 observed: 
[wjhen ruled upon it decides no rights , and ca ll s into existence no process by wh ich the 
rights will be decided. The decision will take place in the framework of a distinct 
procedure, the outcome and course of which wi ll be quite unaffected by whether or not 
Mareva relief has been granted . Again, if the application ucceeds the relief granted 
bears no resemblance to an orthodox interlocutory injunction which in a provisional 
and temporary way does seek to enforce rights, or to the kind of interim procedural 
measure which aims to make more effective the conduct of the action or matter m 
which the substantive l'ight~ of the plaintiff are ascertai ned. Nor does the Mareva 
88 Hon B Engli sh (9 August 2000) 589 NZPD 4491 . 
89 S Power (9 August 2000) 589 NZPD 4479. 
90 Employment Relations Bill 2000, no 8- 1, cl 25. 
91 Mercedes-Benz AC v Leiduck [ 1995 J J A ll ER 929 (HL), 941. 
injunction enforce the plaintiff~ ri ghts even when a judgment has ascertained that they 
exist, for it merel y ensures that once the mechanisms of enforcement are set in motion, 
there is something physically available upon which they ca n work . 
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Applying this reasoning, Mareva injunctions cannot be said to relate to the law 
of contract. Mareva relief does not give effect to contractual rights - it simply ensures 
that, if the court deems the defendant to have breached the plaintiff's contractual 
rights , and orders judgment in the plaintiff's favour, the "mechanisms of 
enforcement" are not frustrated by the actions of the defendant. In this way, s 162 
cannot be said to provide jurisdiction. Equally, the same could be said of Anton Piller 
orders. Such orders do not enforce contractual rights . Anton Piller orders si mpl y 
ensure that property, to which the plaintiff may have a claim, or which might be 
useful in resolving issues before the Court, is not destroyed. 92 
D Section 221 of the ERA? 
In Advanced Hair Studio v Barry, the Authority observed that s 221 of the 
ERA might form the basis of its jurisdiction to grant Anton Piller orders. Section 221 
'd 93 prov1 es: 
221 Joinder, waiver, and extension of time 
In order to enable the Court or the Authority, as the case may be, to more effectually 
dispose of any matter before it according to the substantial merits and eq uities of the 
case, it may, at any stage of the proceedings, of its own motion or on the application of 
any of the parties, and upon such terms as it thinks fit. by order, -
(a) direct parties to be joined or struck out; and 
(b) amend or waive any error or defec t in the proceedings; and 
(c) subject to section l 14(4), ex tend the time within which anything is to or may 
be done; and 
(d) genera ll y give such directions as are necessary or expedient in the 
circumstances. 
92 Alllon Piller; ex parte Island Records Ltd [1978] Ch 122 (CA) . See Richard N. Ough The Mareva 
Injun ction and Anion Piller Order: Practice and Precedents (Butterworth s, London, 1987), para l. l. 93 Section 22 1 also applies to the Employment Court. 
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In Brooker.\· Employment Law it is suggested that the Employment Court's 
(and, by analogy, the Authority's) jurisdiction to grant Mareva relief may lie in the 
Court's wide powers under s 22l(d). The learned authors argue that: 94 
a Mareva injunction may "enable the Court ... to more effectually to [sic] dispose of 
any matter before it according to the substantial merits of the case" (~ 221 (d)) by 
preserving assets which might otherwise be dissipated or removed from the Court·~ 
Jurisdiction, thereby depriving a successful plaintiff of the fruits of a favourable 
judgmenl. On this basis it would follow that the Employment Relations Authority, to 
which s 221 equally applies, could also issue a Mareva Injunction. This ability would 
seem consistent with the Authority ' s general role as the first instance decision-maker 
and conversely the Employment Court ' s very narrowly defined role as a Court of first 
instance (particularly in comparison with the position under the ECA). 
Section 221 , as stated, is concerned with "[j]oinder[s], waiver[s] and 
extention[s] of time". On this basis , the section empowers the Employment Court and 
the Authority to join or remove parties from the proceedings,95 amend or wai,e 
defects in the proceedings,96 or extend any time limits in relation to the proceedings . 
The section is procedural in nature , and s 221 (d) is coloured by this. Further, s 221 (d) 
authorises the Autho1ity/Employment Court to give "direction ", not '·orders", the 
latter term being used in s 162. While the term "order" is wide enough to potentially 
encompass Mareva injunctions and Anton Piller orders, "direction" , is not. On these 
bases, s 22l(d) cannot be said to empower either the Employment Court or the 
Authority to grant Mareva injunctions or issue Anton Piller orders. 
1 Whar did Parliament intend? 
No reference was made to cl 231 during the passage of the ERA through 
the House. Nor was there any comment on the clause in the Explanatory note to 
the Bill. 
94 Jason Bull (ed) Brookers £111p/oyme111 Law (looseleaf, Brookers. Wellington, Employment Relauon~ 
Act 2000) para ER221.08 (last updated August 2003 ) 
95 Employment Relation~ Act 2000, ~ 221 (a). 
96 Employment Relations Act 2000, s 221 (b). 
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V JURISDICTION OF THE EMPLOYMENT COURT 
The Emplo ment Court ha claimed jurisdiction to grant Mareva injunctions 
and Anton Piller orders on two bases: 103 ECA (no\.\ s 186(1) ERA); and l04(l)(h) 
ECA. The ju1isdiction of the Employment Court under 104(l)(h) has been discussed 
in pa11 IV C of this paper. and as such . thi part \.\ ill focus only on 186 ERA. ft 
should be noted that s 221 ERA applies to both the Autho1ity and Employment Court. 
and the discussion in part IV D of this paper is therefore also rele ant. 
Section 186 ERA provides: 
186 Employment Court 
( l) This section establishes a court of record. called the Emplo) ment Court, 
which, in addition to the Jumd1cuon and power spec1all 1 conferred on H b) 
thi s Act or any other Act. has all the powers inherent in a court of record. 
(2) The Court established by subsection ( I ) i declared to be the ame Court a 
the Employment Courr established b) section 103 of the Emplo) ment 
Contracts Act 1991. 
In Clentworth ,, Teclmic New Zealand Lld,97 Chief Judge Goddard held tha1. 
either on the basis of s 103 , ors 10..J.( l )(h), the Employment Court had JUnsd1ct1on to 
grant Mareva injunctions . The preponderance of his honour 's discussion, howe\ er. i 
focused ons 103. As his honour stated: 98 
[c]onceptually, as it seems to me, the Court's power to take these steps [grant Mare\ a 
injuncti ons] derives from its tatus as a Court of record with all the pO\\ers inherent in 
such a Court: Employment Contracts Act 1991, s I 03. One of the most important of 
those powers is the power to control its procedure and to protect it process from 
abuse, whether the abuse is by plaintiffs or by defendants. There are many instances of 
the applicauon ot that power. 1 ha\e only this \,ed, exen:1sed that pO\\er Jgainst a 
plaintiff on the defendant 's application. 
97 Cle111 wor1h ,, Tec/11uc Ne11 Zealand Lid j 19% I 3 ER Z 1121 
98 Cle111wor1h v Tecl11uc Ne11 Zealand Lid. above. I 125 . 
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Section 103 ECA (ors 186 ERA) cannot be relied upon in granting Mareva 
injunctions or Anton Piller orders. Primarily, this is because the power to grant these 
orders derives from the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court. The Employment 
Court does not possess this inherent jurisdiction, and the powers bestowed upon it by 
dint of its being a court of record do not afford it this power. 
A Superior and inferior courts 
As noted above,99 the High Court is a superior court. This is implicit in 
the definition of an inferior court in s 2 of the Judicature Act 1908, as any court 
"of inferior ju1isdiction to the Hi gh Court". 100 The Employment Court is an 
inferior court. The High Court is a court of inherent jurisdiction, this being 
affirmed bys 16 of the Judicature Act 1908 . The Employment Court, however, 
is not. Prima facie , nothing is within the jurisdiction of an inferior court unless it 
is expressly shown "on the face of the proceedings that the pa11icular matter i 
within the cognisance of the particular court". 101 
The Employment Cou11, as a specialist Court of record, does have specific 
statutory powers that resemble powers from the inherent jurisdiction, for example, the 
power to fine in respect of contempt of court. However, the learned authors of 
McGechan on Procedure contend that the Court does not possess a full inherent 
jurisdiction in its own right. 102 
In A-G v Benge, the Court of Appeal stated, in obiter: 103 
[i]n general terms, the Employment Contracts Act removed a right of access to the 
"ordinary courts" and in particular the High Court. The Employment Court 1s thu!:, a 
creature of statute. It does not have the inherent jurisdiction of the Hi gh Court. The 
99 See pan Ill B I The Court ' !, inherent Junsd1ct1on . 
100 Andrew Beck Principles of Civil Procedure (2 ed, Brookers, Wellington , 200 I), para 2.2. 1. 101 Halisbury 's Laws of England (Butterworths, London. 2002) Volume 10 Courts, para 309. See also 
Peacock v Bell and Kendal (1667) I Saund 69; R v Chance llor of St Edmundsbury and Ipswich 
Diocese, ex parte White [1948] 1 KB 195 , 208-206. 
102 Nicola Burdon (ed) McCecha11 on Procedure (looseleaf, Brookers, Wellington) para HR236B (last 
updated September 2003). 
103 A-C v Benge [ 1997 J 1 ERNZ 109 ; [ 19971 2 NZLR 435 (CA). 11 3, 439. See also Cadey v Lord 
Cooke of Thom don [ 1999] 2 NZLR 668 ( C ) . 
assumption of jurisdiction by the Employment Court must therefore alway~ be 
referable to a given statutory provision . 
29 
In A-G v Reid, 104 the ful I Court of the High Court held that the Employment 
Court was an inferior court. 
B Does the Employment Court's status as a court of record empower it to make 
these orders? 
The distinction between courts of record and not courts of record was 
historically important, affecting both the jurisdiction to fine or imprison and the 
conclusiveness of the Court's record. 105 Today, the distinction is of little importance, 
as all courts in New Zealand, other than the Auth01ity and the Coronial Courts, are 
expressly declared by statute to be courts of record. Essentially, courts of record are 
empowered to control their own procedure, and protect their process from abuse. In 
particular, a court of record may fine or imprison for contempt of court. 106 
The view that Mareva injunctions prevent abuse of the Court ' s process is 
supported by the majority of the High Court of Australia 107 in Patrick Stevedores 
Operations (No 2) Pty Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia, 108 who observed that the 
Mareva injunction is "the paradigm example of an order to prevent the frustration of 
the Court ' s process". 
In Owen v McAlpine Industries Ltd, 109 the Employment Court considered 
whether it had authority to control the appearance of counsel where a potential 
conflict of interest was imminent. The Court concluded, having made reference to 
Clentworth, that the Employment Court may have "inherent powers which do not 
derive from specific statutory powers". 
104 A -C 1• Reid l2000J 2 ERNZ 258; [2000] 2 ZLR 377 (EC), 263, 383. 
105 The Laws of New Zealand (Butterworths, Wellington, 2002) Volume I O Courts, para 5. 
106 See Andrew Beck Prin ciples of Ci1•il Procedure (2 ed, Brookers, Wellington, 200 I), para 2.2 . 1; see 
also Ex P Coldsbrouglz Morr & Co Ltd; Re Magrath ( 1931 ) 32 SR (NSW) 338 . 
107 Brennan CJ and McHugh , Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ . 
108 Patrick Stevedores Operations (No 2) Pry Ltd 1• Mari1ime Union of Aus1ralia ( 1998) 153 ALR 643 
(HC), 658-659 . 
109 O wen 1• McA/pine /11dus1ries Lid [ 19991 I ER Z 870 (EC). 
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In light of clear autho1ity to the contrary, namely A-G v Benge and A-G v Reid, 
it is difficult to accept the above proposition. However, even if Owen was correctly 
decided, this does not necessarily mean the Employment Court has jurisdiction to 
grant Mareva injunctions . In Owen, the Employment Court sought only to restrain the 
actions of a barrister who intended to appear before it. In this sense, Owen can be 
distinguished from the decision of the Doogue J in Sutherland v Sutherland. 110 In this 
case, his honour held that the Family Court was not a court of inherent jurisdiction . 
As an inferior Court, the Family Court only has the power to control actions or 
omissions that impact on its own processes in respect of proceedings before it. As 
such, the Family Court was said to be unable to generally supervise the legal 
profession. 
As discussed above, 111 the power to grant Mareva injunctions and Anton Piller 
orders is derived from the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court. This was 
acknowledged both in the United Kingdom , 11 2 and New Zealand. 11 3 Indeed, the ability 
of the High Court to grant such orders derives from its ability to administer the 
general laws of the land. 114 One of the primary reasons for this is the pervasive nature 
of both Mareva injunctions and Anton Piller orders. Both orders may be granted 
against persons who are not yet parties to proceedings. 115 Indeed, such orders may be 
made by one Court in favour of proceedings in another.116 Further, such orders, 
particularly Mareva injunctions , may have a significant impact on third parti es. 11 7 
The decision of Doogue Jin Sutherland, is more instructive in thi s regard. It is 
one thing, as the Employment Court did in Owen, to claim control over a banister 
who seeks to appear before the Court. It is quite another, as was the case in 
110 Suth erland v Surh erland (2001 ) 2 1 FRNZ 529 (HC), 536. 
111 See part Ill B l The Court 's inherent jurisdiction. 
11 2 Mareva Colllpania Na viera SA v International Bulk Carriers SA [ 1975] 2 Lloyd' s Rep 509 (CA); 
Anton Piller KC v Manufacturing Processes Ltd [ 1976] Ch 55 (CA). 
113 Hunt v BP Exploration Co ( Libya) Ltd [ 1980] l NZLR l 04 (SC); Busby v Thorn EM/ Video 
Programmes L!c/ [1984J l NZLR461 (CA). 
114 Sir Jack Jacob ·'The Inherent Juri sdicti on o f the Court"' ( l 970) CLP 23, 27 . See al so Prior v 
Parshelf 45 Ltd (in rec) [2000] l ZLR 385,389 (CA). 
115 Mareva Colllpania Naviera SA, above; Anton Piller KC v Ma1111facturi11g Processes Ltd, above. 
116 Palmer v Lees Power Seel Ltd [ l 996] l ERNZ 165 (HC); BFS Marketing Ltd v Field [ 1992] 2 ERNZ 
1105 (HC). 
117 "A Mareva injunction is like ly to affec t creditors who are not parti es to the employment contract". 
See Jason Bull (ed) Brookers E111ploy111 e11t Co11trac1s ( loose leaf, Brookers. Wellingto n. Empl oy ment 
Contracts Act 199 l ) para EC l-+0 . l l ( las t updated 2000). 
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Sutherland, to claim control over the profession generally. Equally, Mareva 
injunctions and Anton Piller orders do not simply affect those before the Court. 
Indeed, both the Employment Court and Authority have granted orders over persons 
. I d . d. i 18 not yet invo ve in procee ings. 
Indeed, even the decision of the High Court of Australia in Patrick Stevedores 
Operations (No 2) Pty Ltd, which ostensibly supports the position adopted by Chief 
Judge Goddard in Clentworth, draws this basic distinction. The majority noted that: 119 
[t]he general principle which informs the exercise of the power to grant interlocutory 
relief is that the Court may make such orders, m leasr againsr rlze parries to rhe 
proceedings against whom final relief 111ighr be granted, as are needed to ensure the 
effective exercise of the Jurisdiction invoked. The Federal Court had jurisdiction to 
make interlocutory orders to prevent frustration of its process in the present proceeding 
[emphasis added]. 
For this reason , the Court of Appeal held, in Prior v Parshelf 45 Lrd (in 
rec), 120 that, pending an appeal to the Privy Council , it does not have jurisdiction to 
grant Mareva relief. As Blanchard J stated: 121 
[t]hese statements may provide guidance when an application is made pending 
determination of an appeal to thi s Court but it does not follow that there exists a 
corresponding inherent jurisdiction when there is to be a further appeal to the Pri vy 
Council. As was observed in Sraples, the English Court of Appeal is a branch of the 
Supreme Court. It therefore possesses an inherent jurisdiction which supplements the 
powers given to it by statute and by rules. This Court is not in a similar position . It is 
constituted under Part II of the Judicature Act (s 57 ( 1)). Its jurisdiction derives from 
statute and, in relation to appeals to the Judicial Committee, from the Privy Council 
Rules. Unlike the High Court, 1t does not ha ve "all Judicial Jurisdil.:t1on which may be 
necessary to administer the laws of Nev\ Zealand" (s 16). 
11 8 See, for example, Wilson & Horron Lrd "A (19 June 2002 Employment Relations Authority 
Auckland A Al 87 /02; AEA550/02); see, for example, Clenrworth v Technic New Zealand Ltd [ 1998] 3 
ERNZ 1121 (EC). 
119 Par rick Srevedores Operario11s ( No 2) Ptv Lrd I ' Mariri111e Union of Ausrralia ( 1998) 153 ALR 643 
(HC), 659 . 
120 Prior v Pars/zelf ..J5 Lrd (in rec) [2000J 1 NZLR 385 (CA). 
121 Prior v Pars he If ..J5 Ltd ( in rec ), above, 391. 
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While, in a broad sense, Mareva injunctions and Anton Piller orders may 
prevent abuse of the Court's process, they are far more pervasive, and indeed, 
invasive, than that. Given the potentially wide ranging impact such orders may have, 
not only parties to a proceedin g, but on pa11ies who may be part of so me future 
proceedings, and unrelated third parties, the ability to grant these orders derive , 
therefore, from the High Court's inherent jurisdiction only. 
Although the District Court can grant Mareva injunctions, it may do so only in 
respect of property situated in New Zealand. 122 Further, by enacting s 42(2) of the 
District Cow1s Act 1947 , Parliament has explicitly provided the District Court with 
authority to do so. 123 If Parliament had intended to grant the Employment Court (and, 
indeed, the Authority) such a power, it would have done so explicitly, as it did in both 
s 42(2) and, in the case of Anton Piller orders, s 26J(4) of the Judicature Act 1908. 
Judge Sheppard, of the Planning Tribunal, made this point well in Geotherm Energy 
Ltd v Waikaro Regional Council, where hi s honour stated : 124 
as the tribunal is not a superi or Court with inherent jurisdiction . having regard to the 
nature of Planning Tribunal proceedings generall y, and the omission of the relevant 
topic from the powers of the District Court se lected for conferr ing on the Planning 
Tribunal, I hold that the Tribunal does not possess authority to order the giving of 
security for costs. If it is intended that the Tribunal should ha ve that authority for the 
future. it can be conferred expressly . 
VI REMEDIES 
Those whom the Authority has already made orders against will be unable to 
appeal to the Employment Court, as such challenges had to have occun-ed within 28 
days after the determination .125 However, given that such a challenge will question the 
jurisdiction of the Authority to make the orders in question, the determinations will 
122 District Courts Act 1947, s 42(2). 
123 Section 42(2) of the District Courts Act 1947 provides: ·' otwithstanding subsection (I) of this 
section, an interlocutory injunction restraining a party to a proceeding (whether domiciled, resident or 
present in New Zealand) from removing from New Zealand, or otherwise dealing with, assets in New 
Zealand is the onl y interlocutory injunction in the nature of a Mareva injunction that a Judge may 
grant". 
124 Ceo1hen11 Energy LICI \' Waik(lfo Reg ional Council I 1994J ZRMA 139 (PT), 14-t. 
125 Employment Relations Act 2000, s J 79. 
still be open to judicial review. 126 The Employment Court will hear such a review . 127 
Similarly, challenges to the Employment Court's jurisdiction to grant Mareva 
injunctions and Anton Piller order are reviewable by the High Court.128 
A Grounds of Review 
Excess of jurisdiction is a well-recognised ground of review. 129 In relation to 
determinations of the Authority, an appli cation for judicial re view must be filed with 
the Employment Court. 130 To review decisions of the Employment Court, an 
application must be filed with the Hi gh Court pursuant to s 4 of the Judi cature 
Amendment Act 1972. 
In both cases, the applicant should request an order in the nature of 
certiorari ,131 which, if granted, will quash the deci sion of the Authority/Employment 
Court to grant the orders in question. 132 
It should be noted, however, that the decision to provide relief is discretionary. 
As such, delay may be fatal to any possible review .133 As a result, it is possible the 
Employment Court/High Court will refuse to provide relief in most of the case 
addressed in this paper. 
B Consequences of successful review proceedings 
Before the Authority or Court grant a Mareva injunction or Anton Piller order, 
the applicant must give an undertakin g as to damages to the defendant. 134 The 
126 Employment Relations Act 2000, s l 8-l('.2)(b). 
127 Employment Rel ations Act 2000, s 194(2). 
128 Employment Relations Act 2000, s l 93(2)(b). 
129 Jason Bull (ed) Brookers E111p/oy111e11t W\\ ' (looseleaf, Brookers, Wellington, Employment Relations 
Act 2000) para ER194.05 (last updated August 2003). 
130 Employment Relations Act 2000, s 19-l. 
131 Judicature Amendment Ac t 1972, s -+(2). 
132 See Re £rebus Royal Co111111issio11; Air NZ Ltd v Mahon (1981] l ZLR 6 14 (CA); for in-depth 
di scuss ion of certi orari and other possible remedies. see icola Burdon (ed) McCechan 011 Procedure 
( looseleaf, Brookers, Wellington) para JA4.0 (last updated September 2003). 
133 Turner v Allison [ 1971 l NZLR 833, where delay of nearl y a year was fatal. 
134 There is debate as to whether an applicant need give an undertak ing where the High Court grants a 
Mareva injunction on the basis on its inherent j uri sd iction, ra ther than r 236A(3) HCR. However. th1~ 
argument is of little relevance to both the Authori ty and the Court. If ei ther body does have junsd1ct1on. 
it is deri ved from statute: see Fran ci:, ,. Supre111e Sen ·ices Ltd ( 1987) 2 PR Z 532: see also 1cola 
undertaking must be one of substance, and provide real protection to the defendant in 
the event the Mareva injunction was wrongly issued. 135 
In Bradley v Byrne, Holland J held that: 136 
the undertaking gi ven by the pl aintiff is an undertaking to the Court and is not a 
contract between the parti es. Nevertheless in order to prov ide some degree of certainty 
in the application of the law it has been held that the assessment should be made as i f 
the undertaking were a contrac t so that the award would not cover loss which could not 
form part o f an award for damages at co mmon law for breach of contrac t. 
It foll ows that the principles of fo reseeability or remoteness apply as we ll as the 
principle that a perso n wronged should not be able to recover damages which have 
been unreasonabl y incurred. 
It may be poss ible to obtain damages if the Authority/Employment Court 
acted ultra vires. In Advanced Hair Studio Ltd v Barry, 137 the Authority noted the 
possibility, if it did not have jurisdiction to grant Mareva injuncti ons, of the defendant 
seeking to enforce the appli cant 's undertakin g as to damages. 
In the case of Mareva injunctions, if the plaintiff was eventuall y successful at 
trial , the defendant will not have recourse, as the assets in question will no longer be 
hers . However, if the case settl ed, or the plaintiff was unsuccessful , the defendant may 
be able to obtain compensation for any loss incuJTed as a result of her asset being 
frozen. 
Burdon (ed) McCechan on Procedure (looseleaf. Broo kers. Wellington) para HR236B . I l ( last updated 
September 2003). !though there 1s some doubt as to whether the A nton Pil ler order ,s an InJ uncuon. 
there 1s no doubt tha t an undertaking as Lo damages ,~ requ ired from the plain li ff: ee 811sb1 1 Thom 
EM/ Video Prog rw11 11 1es Lid [ 198-1 1 I ZLR -16 1 (CA). 467; N ico la Burdon (ed) McCeclw11 011 
Procedure (looseleaf, Brookers, Well,ngtonJ para HR33 I .25 ( last updated September 2003). 
135 Taylor v Ma/111 e ( 11 September 1992 High Court Wellington CP786/90 ; CP643/90. M cGechan J ); 
Tema Holdings Ltd ,, Kosw nich ( 16 A pril 1992 High Court Auckland CP509/92, Thomas J ). 
136 Bradley v Byrn e ( 1993) 7 PRNZ 263, 269 . 
137 Advanced Hair Srudio Lrd v Barry (5 June 2003 Employment Relations A uthority A uckland 
A Al 65/03; AEA379/03), para 9. 
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Although there is clear authority that simply because an Anton Piller order has 
been executed, this is no reason why it should not be set aside. 138 However, expiration 
of time may weigh against discharge of the order. In Columbia Picture Industries Inc 
v Robinson, Scott J, refusing to discharge an order executed 3 years previous, on the 
ground of material non-disclosure by the plaintiff,139 stated that "I am instinctively 
disinclined to make by judicial order what seems to me to be an empty gesture". 1 .. o 
Irrespective of the conduct of the applicant, the Court would still have had discretion 
to grant the order. In this case, the Authority/Employment Court were acting without 
authority, and as such, the principles enunciated in Columbia Pictures Industries Inc 
should not apply. However, as noted, the Court may refuse to grant relief in judicial 
review proceedings due to lapse of time. 
The case of Anton Piller orders 1s more interesting. As Scott J noted in 
Columbia Pictures Industries Inc: 141 
[s]olicitors who execute an Anton Piller order do so, in important part, as officers of the court. 
It is the court which places them in a position to do that which would, without the court 
authority, be a flagrant and inexcusable trespass. They are placed 1n a position in which their 
actions are likel y to ca use shock. distress and often outrage to those against whom the order~ 
are executed. 
It is possible that a solicitor, in execution of an Anton Piller order, could be 
caught by the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 ("BORA"), pursuant to s 3(b). 
Section 3 provides: 
3 Application-
This Bill of Rights applies only to acts done-
(a) By the legislative, executive, or judicial branches of the government of New 
Zealand; or 
138 Booker McConnel ,, P/asco11· I 19851 RPC -125; \VEA Records Ltd, . 1'1swn.1 Clw1111e/ ./ Lui 1198. 12 
All ER 589 (CA). 
139 The applicant for a Mareva Injunction or Anton Piller Order is under a duty to the court to mal-.e full 
and frank disclosure of all material facts: see Siporex Trade SA ,, Collldel Commodities Ltd l 1986 J NU 
Rep 538. 
14° Columbia Picture Industries Inc v Robinson [ 1987) I Ch 38. 87 . 
141 Col1111lbia Picture Industries In c, above, 380. 
(b) By any person or bod) in the per formance of any public function. power, or 
duty conferred or imposed on that person or body by or pursuant to law. 
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In R v N, 142 the Court of Appeal held that a private citizen in the performance 
of a citizen's arrest did not fall within s 3(b). The Court came to this conclusion on the 
basis that s 35 of the Crimes Act did not positively empower citizens to perform 
anests; it simply provides immunity from prosecution . Gi ven that, it could not be said 
that a citizen's aJTest is a "public function , power, or duty".143 
Where a solicitor gives effect to an Anton Piller order, similar difficulties do 
not arise . As noted above, solicitors do so as officers of the court, and act pursuant to 
a court order. As such, they are pe1forming either a "public function or power", the 
authority to do so having been confeJTed by a court order. 
There could be a claim that the defendant's s 21 right to be free from 
unreasonable search and seizure have been breached. Although "illegality is not the 
touchstone of unreasonableness", 144 if the court gives due regard to the illegality the 
solicitor's conduct, and the likely invasive nature of any given search, the Court may 
conclude that the search amounted to an "unreasonable search and seizure". However, 
presuming the order has been effected in an orderly manner, the Court may consider 
the breach to be of a purely technical nature, and as such, not unreasonable . Given 
that the solicitors in question would have thought themselves authorised to unde11ake 
the searches, this is a likely result. 145 
If the court does consider the given search to have been in breach of s 21, the 
defendant may seek to obtain Baigenr compensation .146 Further, if evidence has been 
obtained as a result the search, and thi s formed the basis of a successful claim by the 
plaintiff, the defendant could seek to have the case reopened and the evidence 
14 2 R v N [ 1999] l ZLR 713 (CA). 
143 R v N, above, 720. 
144 R v Grayson & Taylor (1997] l NZLR 399 (CA) , 407 . 
145 R ,, Grayson & Taylor, above, -W8 - by ana logy to search warrants. 
146 Simpson v A-G (Ba/gent 's Case) [1994] 3 NZLR 667 (CA) . 
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excluded. 147 However, given that, unlike in a criminal context, monetary 
compensation is probably sufficient, exclusion of evidence is unlikely. 148 
Further, the there exists the possibility of simply taking an action for trespass 
against the solicitor. If the solicitor' actions were unlawful, an action in trespass is 
likely to be the easiest route to obtaining a remedy, as damages are available even if 
the defendant has suffered no harm. i.i9 
VI SHOULD THE AUTHORITY AND EMPLOYMENT COURT HA VE 
JURISDICTION? 
The starting point of this discussion must be the nature of the orders 
themselves. While ancillary to the main action, Anton Piller orders or Mareva 
injunctions often have a decisive effect on a case. 150 As Sir John Donaldson LJ stated 
in Bank Mellat v Nikpour,15 1 [i]t [the Mareva injunction] i in effect, together with the 
Anton Piller order, one of the law 's two "nuclear" weapons. 
Further, since, in determining whether to grant Mareva relief a judge will use 
her discretion and experience to decide the me1its of the application, appellate courts 
have been reluctant to interfere with the exercise of that discretion. 15 2 Consequently, 
the imposition of a Mareva injunction is not lightly ordered. 153 
It has been emphasised that the Anton Piller order is at the extremity of the 
court's powers. 154 The orders are , however, granted with increasing frequency. 
Although no record of numbers is kept,155 in 1977 the Mareva injunction was 
147 R v Shah eed ]2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA). 
148 R v Shaheed, above, 418 . 
149 Mayfair L!d v Pears [1987] l NZLR 459 (CA). 
150 Richard N. Ough Th e Mareva !11j1111c1io11 and All/011 Piller Order: Prac1ice and Precede111s 
(Butterworths, London, 1987), para 1.3. 
151 Mella! v Nikpour [ 1985} FSR 87 . 92; see al so Colu111bia Pictures v Robinson [ 1986] 3 All ER 338 . 
356, concerning the ·traumatic effect' o r an Anton Piller Order. 
152 Ninemia Corporarion . 
153 Mark S.W. Hoyle The Mareva /11ju11 c1io11 a11d Related Orders (2 ed , Lloyds, London, 1989), 11. 
154 Anton Piller KC v Ma11ufac1uri11g Processes Ltd [1976] Ch 55 (CA), 61 , Ormrod LJ. 
155 Nor is any such record kept 111 the UK. 
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described as "extremely popular",n while in 1978 the Anton Piller order \\a aid to 
be "i n dai ly use". 157 In Siporex Trade SA 1· Comdel. Bingham J noted: 1-
[t]he ad\ent of the lare\a 1nJunct1on ha~. a 1~ notonou~. led tn [ex panel appl1 auon~ t 1r 
inJuncme relief[ becoming commonplace. hundred being made ea ·h ~ear and relJtl\ea~ te, 
refu ed. 
Funher, the courts have periodically commented that Ylareva injunction and 
Anton Pil ler orders are, perhaps, being too freely granted. In Systemalica v London 
Compurer Cenrre.
159 Whitford J rated that too free u e \\ a being made b) plaintiff 
of the Anton Pi Iler pro, is1on. In Siporex Trade SA 1· Comdel. 160 Bingham J made 
reference to 'the laxity of practice which the Mare a injunction ha indirect!) cau ed·. 
A The Authority? 
It 1s difficult to discern from the Authorit) ' determinations whether it , 
decisions to grant Mareva relief and Anton Piller order - ha,e been rea-onable. 
However, there is empirical evidence to uggesr that. a- Scott J noted in Co/11111bw 
Pictures v Robinson, 161 ·· ... on the e one-sided appli ar1on Judge ma) , er) ea II:, 
become too enthusiastic". Since 1996. the Employment Court ha granted nine 
. . . 16? d d 163 . d h h Mareva inJunct1ons - an six Anton Piller or ers - keeping in mm t at t e 
156 S1sk111a ( Cargo 011'nen} 1 Dwo:, Co111pa11w Nm 1era SA [ 197 ] ~ \\'LR l \ HLJ. -~6. Lmd 
Hailsham of t Marylebone. 
157 ex pane Island Records Lid [197 ] Ch 122 (CA). 133, Lord Denning MR; see also the -omment~ ot 
Goulding J in Pro1ecl0r Alarms Lid 1• Maxun Alanna Lid [ 197 ] FSR -1-1~. -1-13. 
158 Siporex Trade SA v Comdel Com111odi1ies Lid [ 1986] NLJ Rep 53 . 539; ee al o R1 hard . Ough 
The Mareva lnjunc1ion and Al1lon Piller Order: Prac1ice and Precedellls (Butrenrnrths. London. 
1987), para 1.6. 
159 Sysremarica v London Compwer Ce111re [1983] FSR 313,316. 
160 Siporex Trade SA v Comdel Co111modines Lid [ 1986] l'\TLJ Rep 53 . 539. 
161 Columbia Piuure:, 1• Robinson [ 1986] 3 All ER 33 . 375. 
162 McNauglu v Predict ( NZ) Lid [ 1996] ~ ER Z 5-16: Weslie, 1 Tnan (?le Cable:, I \'Z ) Lid\ 13 
ovember 1997 Employment Court Auckland AEC 133/97; A 16-1/97. Judge Tra \ 1 J . • \ ei/:,011 1 81m/111c 
lndus1ries Lid ( 5 February 199 EmplO) ment Court Auckland AEC6/9 ; A 13/9 . Judge Colgan). 
Clentwonh 1• Tecluuc Nell' Zealand Lid (-1 December 199 Emp!O) ment ourt \\'elhngton \\ ~ , 9 . 
WEC 128/98, Chief Judge Goddard ); Kerrigan I Fun Staflon Kindergarten Ltd l - larch 1999 
Emp loyment Court Auckland AC 14/99; AEC~2!9. Judge Colgan): E111cno11 1 \\ oo<IH-urd ( ,- t\lJrch 
1999 Employment Court Auckland ACI /99; AEC29/99. Judge Colgan). \uvrne1-Gt'11eral 011 Bdw/j 
of The Deparrme,u of Labour v Sil'orn1•ong ( 11 ovember 1999 Emplo} ment Court Aud.land 
AC89/99; AEC 162/99. Judge Colgan); A110rne1-Ce11eral on behalf of ll1e Deparr111elll of Labour 1· 
Sopana Kirk, (TIA Sewing Together) (23 Ma} 2000 Emplo} ment Court u 'kl and ,.\C-10/00: 
AEC6'.2/0023, Judge Colgan); Yo1osef 1 \ 11nda Paper ( .\, e11 Zea/al/(/ J Lui ( I I :.\ugu~t 2000 Emp!O) ment 
Court Auckland A 67/00; AEC97/00. Judge Colgan ). 
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T1ibunal did not claim jurisdi ction to do so. Since 2001 , however, the Authority has 
already granted four Mareva injunctions and five Anton Piller orders.164 Given the 
invasive nature of both orders, one would have expected the Authority to act in a 
more judicious manner. 
Further, as counsel for both parties commented m Jerram v Franklin 
Veterinary Services ( 1977) Ltd: 165 
it was a remarkable change from prev ious practi ce that inj uncti ve orders (including 
Anton Piller orders and M areva inj unct ions) might now be made by adj udica tors. some 
of whom are not lega ll y quali fied or tra ined fo llowi ng an in formal meeting around a 
table at which some unsworn evidence wa~ prov ided and relied on, as I was told had 
occurred in this case. 
In McAlister v Cayman Holdings Ltd, the Authority stated that : 166 
[ i ] t might be expected that for the purposes of effi ciency, to avoid double cost and 
double handling, resolution of the employment rel ationship problem should be dea lt 
with through its vari ous stages in the one place. 
With respect, thi s is not a compelling reasoning for allowing the Authority 
wide ranging injunctive powers. When a party seeks to obtain a Mareva injunction or 
Anton Piller order, a separate appli cati on must be made to hear the issue, most likely 
on an ex parre basis. Whether a part y had proceedings pending with the Authorit y 
makes little difference to the effi ciency of such a hearing. The party can easil y make 
an application to the Employment Court and indeed the Hi gh Court as it can to the 
Authority. Presumably, these bodies will consider such applications expeditiousl y. 
163 New Zealand Rail Lid I' Na1ional Union Of Railll'ay Worke rs Of New Zealand In c ( No I ) f 199'.2 J 3 
ERNZ 964 ; No nhern Amalga11w1ed Workers Union Inc v Engineers Un ion ( I August 1994 
Employment Court Wellington WEC41 /94; W88/94 Chief Judge Goddard); New Zealand Food 
lndus1ries Lid v Suckling (29 August 1996 Employment Court Auckl and AEC52/96; A I 28/96 29, 
Judge Co lgan); Empress Abalone Ltd v Langdon ( 18 June 1999 Employment Court Christchurch CC 
14A/99, Chief Judge Goddard); Co1111111111ica1io11 Am Ltd v Graw Employment Court (7 October 1999 
Employment Court Auckl and AC77/99; AEC 140/99 Judge Trav is); A. C. Nie lsen ( NZ) Ltd v 
Pappajloratos ( 14 Jul y 2003 Employment Court Wellington WCI 7 A/03; WRC9/03, Judge C M 
Shaw). 
164 See note 51. 
165 Jerram v Franklin Ve1eri11ary Sen,ices (2000] l ERNZ 157 (EC), 164-165 . 
166 McA lis1er & Anor 1• Cay111an /-fo ldin gs Lui (5 December 2002 Employment Relauons A uthonty 
A uckland AA 352/02; AEA 11 76/0'.2, Mr A Dumbleton (member)). para 7. 
~o 
Fu11her, such an application will have little in common with substanuve employment 
law issues . As such, the Authority's contention that allowing it such power avoids 
double handling it not credible. 
Further, it is submitted that providing the Authority with jurisdiction to grant 
Mareva injunctions and Anton Piller orders would be inconsistent with the underl ying 
purpose of the Authority. Ass 157 of the ERA states: 167 
[t]he Authority is an investigative body that has the role of resolving employment 
relationship problems by establishing the facts and making a determination according 
to the substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities . 
The Authority operates in an informal way, and was not intended to be an 
overtly legal body. 168 Both Mareva injunctions and Anton Piller orders are 
complicated and technical forms of relief. They are of a purely legal nature , and do 
not concern substantive employment law. By attempting to extend its jurisdiction in 
this respect, the Authority is moving away from its primary focus, that being the 
employment relationship. While the Authority's attempt to become a 'one stop shop ' 
for litigants could be considered noble, this is not its proper role. Both Mareva 
injunctions and Anton Piller orders are particularly invasive powers, and as such , 
should be administered by a limited number of highly trained judicial officers. It 
should also be noted that Authority Members are not required to be legally trained, 169 
and although they will no doubt have received training with respect to injunctive 
relief, Members are unlikely to be as qualified to make such orders as High Court 
Judges . 
B The Employment Court 
The author notes that most of the preceding arguments are of limited 
application to this body. Considering that the Authority and Employment Court 
together have exclusive jurisdiction of employment issue in ew Zealand, 170 and that 
167 Employment Relat ions Act '.WOO s l 57. 
16 ·'Going to the Employment Relauons Authori ty", £111p/oy111 en1 Relario11s Service, 
http://www.ers.dol. govt. nz/problem/authority/ (last accessed 3 August 2003). 
169 S Power (9 August 2000) 589 NZPD 4479. 
170 Employment Relations Act 2000, ss 161, 187. 
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the District Court has been granted authority, at least in relation to Mareva 
· · · 171 1nJunct1ons, there seems no reason why the Employment Court should not be 
extended the same power . 
VIII CONCLUSION 
Conventionally, only the High Court has had ju1isdiction to grant both Mareva 
injunctions and Anton Pi Iler orders. The basis of the High Court' juri diction i its 
status as a court of inherent jurisdiction. 172 The Autho1ity is not a court of inherent 
jurisdiction, nor, indeed, is it a court of record. On this basis alone, the juri diction of 
the Autho1ity to make such orders is shaky. 
Although the Autho1ity has claimed such a power, its attempts to draw on 
disparate provisions in the ERA to justify this are unconvincing. Sections 157 , 160 
and 221 concern the procedure of the Authority, and cannot be said to empower it to 
make wide-ranging injunctive orders that are essentially unrelated to the procedure of 
the Authority. Section 162 (which also applies to the Employment Court) only 
empowers the Authority to make orders of a contractual nature, and as such. does not 
authorise the granting of Mareva Injunctions or Anton Piller order . Although there is 
ostensibly supporting authority for the proposition that s 162 does provide the 
requisite jurisdiction, that authority, McNaught, is based upon a flawed reading of the 
purported supporting authority, and is inconsistent with the clear words of the section. 
Further, s 186 of the ERA does not empower the Employment Court to grant 
Mareva injunctions and Anton Piller orders. Although courts of record have inherent 
powers, they do not have inherent jurisdiction. Given the pervasive nature of both 
orders, and the fact that both can be ordered against people who are not, as yet, parties 
to proceedings before the Employment Court, the Employment Court's status as a 
cou11 of record does not provide the it with the requisite jurisdiction. The autho1ity to 
grant such orders derives from the High Courts ability to generally administer the law. 
171 District Courts Act 1947. s -12(2) . 
172 Mareva Co111pa11ia Naviera SA v !11ternmio11a/ 811/k Carners A [1975] 2 Lloyd's Rep 509 (CA); 
Anton Piller KC v Manufacturing Processes Ltd [ 1976] Ch 55 (CA). 
The Employment Court, as an inferior cou11, must act within the bounds of its 
constitutive statute. 173 
In the event that either the Authority/Employment Court have acted ultra 
vires, their actions are judicially reviewable. Presuming the decisions are quashed, the 
original defendants may be able to obtain compensation through enforcement of any 
undertakings as to damages , Baigenr compensation , or through an action in trespass . 
Irrespective of the jurisdictional issue, the Authority was established to be a 
non-technical institution , whose focus is to be on the employment relationship. 
Allowing the Authority to grant Mareva injunctions or Anton Piller orders i 
inconsistent with its primary purpose, and should therefore not be allowed. There 
appears no good reason why the Employment Court should not be granted 
jurisdiction. 
173 Prior v Parshelf-15 Ltd (in rec) [:WOO] I NZLR 385 (CAJ. 
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